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Abstract—This paper deals with day-ahead power systems
security planning under uncertainties, by posing an optimization
problem over a set of power injection scenarios that could
show up the next day and modeling the next day’s real-time
control strategies aiming at ensuring security with respect to
contingencies by a combination of preventive and corrective
controls. We seek to determine whether and which day-ahead
decisions must be taken so that for scenarios over the next day
there still exists an acceptable combination of preventive and
corrective controls ensuring system security for any postulated
contingency. We formulate this task as a three-stage feasibility
checking problem, where the first stage corresponds to day-ahead
decisions, the second stage to preventive control actions, and the
third stage to corrective post-contingency controls. We propose
a solution approach based on the problem decomposition into
successive optimal power flow (OPF) and security-constrained
optimal power flow (SCOPF) problems of a special type. Our
approach is illustrated on the Nordic32 system and on a 1203-
bus model of a real-life system.
Index Terms—power systems security, operation planning un-
der uncertainty, worst-case analysis, security-constrained optimal
power flow, nonlinear programming
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Short-term power systems operation and control
SHort-term power systems operation and control (e.g. from24 hours ahead to real-time) [1] is generally characterized
by four main tasks: (i) unit commitment (UC) [1]–[4], (ii)
system security planning, (iii) real-time preventive security
control and (iv) corrective/emergency security control. The
former two problems belong to the day-ahead operational
planning framework, the two others are handled intradaily (e.g.
via various SCOPF formulations [5]). The UC is a market-
based problem, solved by generating companies or through
a centralized pool operator, that determines generator units
scheduling (commits and dispatches) e.g. for each period of
time of the next day. Security planning is carried out by the
transmission system operator (TSO) in order to procure suffi-
cient transmission and generation reserves so that intradaily
preventive/corrective actions can ensure the security of the
power system for postulated contingencies and for each period
of time of the next day. Relying on the output of stage (i), this
paper focuses on problem (ii).
B. Motivations
Increasing levels of uncertainties (e.g. wind power, cross-
border interchanges, load evolution, etc.) make the day-ahead
security planning task targeting feasibility of security control
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during the next day more and more difficult. To cope with this
problem without relying on probabilistic methods, one may
model foreseeable next-day scenarios in the form of a set of
possible power injection intervals, and seek to ensure that the
worst foreseeable scenario with respect to each contingency
is still controllable by appropriate combinations of preventive
and corrective actions. Formulating the day-ahead security
planning problem in this way leads to a robust three-stage
decision making problem, where the first stage concerns day-
ahead decisions, the second stage concerns preventive controls
that may be adapted to the actual injection pattern, and the
third stage concerns corrective (post-contingency) controls that
may be adapted both to injection scenario and contingency.
The huge computational complexity of this problem, and
the difficulty to calibrate its uncertainty models, call for
new modeling and computational approaches for day-ahead
operation planning of electric power systems.
C. Related work
The worst-case operating conditions of a power system
under operational uncertainty have been tackled in the lit-
erature mostly in the framework of security margins [6]–
[9]. These approaches look for computing minimum security
margins under operational uncertainty with respect to either
thermal overloads [7], [9] or voltage instability [6], [8], [9].
These approaches yield min-max optimization problems since
a security margin is by definition the maximum value of
the loading parameter for a given path of system evolution.
However these works do not consider the help of preventive
or corrective actions to manage the worst operating states.
Ref. [10] introduced a more comprehensive framework
to address the day-ahead operation planning problem, by
formulating it as a three-stage decision making process distin-
guishing between strategic operation planning decisions (e.g.
imposing must-runs, postponing maintenance works, etc.),
real-time preventive controls (e.g. generation rescheduling,
voltage-control), and last-resort corrective controls (e.g. net-
work switching, phase shifter actions, etc.). In this work, the
worst case scenario with respect to a contingency is formulated
as a bi-level (min-max) optimization problem, and solutions
are proposed that assume a DC load flow approximation
restricted to the management of thermal overload problems.
The paper shows also how to transform this problem into a
MILP problem for which suitable solvers are available.
Ref. [11] tackles the same bi-level worst-case problem in
its nonlinear form (i.e. using the AC network model). It also
proposes an algorithm that relies on the identification of the
constraints that are violated by worst uncertainty patterns.
These patterns are determined separately with respect to
overload and undervoltage problems.
2However, Refs. [10], [11] do not tackle the question of
finding day-ahead decisions and scenario dependent preven-
tive controls to ensure system security under the postulated
injection pattern uncertainties and contingencies.
D. Contribution and organization of the paper
The main contribution of this paper, with respect to Refs.
[10], [11], is to propose an algorithm for the computation of
strategic (day-ahead) control decisions. To perform this task
we extend the scope of the conventional SCOPF to cope with
multiple base cases1 and to distinguish between strategic and
usual preventive actions. In addition, the paper also discusses
causes of infeasibility of some stages of the approach and
proposes some remedies to cope with them. Furthermore, the
approach proposed in Ref. [11] for the computation of worst
cases, which constitutes an important step of our proposal, is
validated on a large size real-life system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides the general formulation of the three-stage decision
making process. Section III presents the proposed algorithms.
Numerical simulation experiments are provided in Section IV.
Section V concludes and discusses further directions of re-
search. The Appendix presents in details the mathematical
formulation of our approach and its solution technique.
II. DAY-AHEAD DECISION MAKING AS A THREE LEVEL
CONSTRAINT SATISFACTION PROBLEM
A. Aims
We seek to determine the day-ahead whether and how the
strategic day-ahead decisions u˜p must be (optimally) changed
such that for each injection scenario s ∈ S that may show up
the next day and for any postulated contingency k ∈ K there
exists a feasible combination of real-time preventive controls
uso and corrective (post-contingency) controls us,kc satisfying
the system operational limits [10].
Note that this problem is first a feasibility checking task,
i.e. for the day-ahead decision u˜p optimal for the most likely
next-day operation scenario one would like to check whether
for any possible scenario s, which may belong to a continuous
domain S and hence take an infinite number of possible values,
the conventional SCOPF2 yields secure next-day operation. If
this problem is not feasible then (optimal) strategic actions up
must be found to satisfy this security requirement.
B. General mathematical formulation of the problem
Our aim is to solve a three stage optimization problem with
the decision variables up at the first stage, followed by chance
variables s choosing the injection scenario, by second stage
decisions uso for adjusting to s by preventive control during the
next day, followed by chance variables choosing a contingency
k ∈ K, followed by last resort third stage decisions us,kc of
post-contingency corrective controls.
1This further SCOPF development has been also suggested in [12].
2The conventional SCOPF computes, for a given up and s, the best
combination of preventive/corrective actions (uso, us,kc ) to cover all postulated
contingencies of set K [15].
We assume that the set K of contingencies is the usual finite
set of (say N−1) outages considered in security management,
while the set S of possible scenarios is infinite (say specified
by upper and lower bounds on the uncertain injection pattern3).
We abstractly formulate the optimization for day-ahead
operation planning as follows (a detailed specific formulation





























c ) ≤ 0 ∀(s, k) ∈ S × K (5)
up ∈ Up (6)
|uso − u˜o| ≤ ∆uo ∀s ∈ S (7)
|us,kc − u
s
o| ≤ ∆uc ∀(s, k) ∈ S × K (8)
where f measures the cost of the deviation of up with respect
to the nominal decision u˜p, Up is the set of available strategic
day-ahead decisions (e.g. must-runs, maintenance decisions,
announced transfer capabilities over the considered period
of time of the next day), s is a vector of uncertain bus
active/reactive power injections which may vary between the
limits s and s, subscript 0 (resp. k) refers to the base case or
pre-contingency (resp. post-contingency) states and controls,
xso (resp. xs,kc ) is the vector of state variables (i.e. magnitude
and angle of voltages) in the pre-contingency (resp. after oc-
currence of contingency k) state envisaged for scenario s, uso is
the vector of preventive control actions (e.g. generators active
power, phase shifter angle, shunt reactive power injection,
transformer ratio, etc.), u˜o is the vector of optimal settings
of base case preventive controls (e.g. obtained previously by a
SCOPF which satisfies all contingency constraints relative to
the most likely state forecasted for the next day), us,kc is the
vector of corrective actions (e.g. generators active power, phase
shifter angle, network switching, etc.), ∆uo (resp. ∆uc) are
the maximal allowed variations of preventive (resp. corrective)
actions, functions gβα denote mainly the power flow equations
in a given state, while functions hβα denote the operating limits
(e.g. branch current, voltage magnitude, and physical bounds
of equipments) in a given state.
We denote with up(S) the optimal strategic decision of the
above optimization problem.
In the above formulation the objective function f , that we
express more explicitly in (22), targets the minimum cost
of strategic decisions deviation from a reference day-ahead
decision. However, depending on the market structure, it is
possible that the TSO does not target the minimization of
generation costs, as it is the case for the TSO of the French
power system, where the objective is to minimize the deviation
of generators active power from the values established by
power producers, and in case of infeasibility, to minimize the
number of generators which must be started-up or shut down.
Anyway, using other objective functions does not modify the
fundamental nature of the problem.
3e.g. S = {s ∈ Rm : si ≤ si ≤ si,∀i = 1, . . . , m}.
3Notice that the above formulation leads essentially to a
three-level min-max-min problem. Also, if the day-ahead
controls are frozen before-hand, it reduces to a bi-level max-
min optimization problem (see [10], [11]) identifying the
most constraining power injection scenarios for the next day.
However, nowadays there is no theoretically or practically
sound algorithm able to solve in a generic way even this
simpler bi-level programming problem, given its features: non-
linear, non-convex, and very large scale [13]. Consequently, in
the power systems area, only linear approximations of bi-level
optimization problems have been reported [7], [10], [14].
We propose an anytime approach, which uses the nonlinear
AC network model, and aims to provide an acceptable solu-
tion of the original three-level problem that is progressively
improved by solving a succession of SCOPF-like problems.
III. PRINCIPLE OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH
The formulation (1)-(8) aims at covering an infinite number
of possible operating scenarios S = {s : s ≤ s ≤ s}, by
choosing a common strategic decision up, scenario dependent
preventive controls uso, ∀s ∈ S, and both scenario and contin-
gency dependent corrective controls us,kc , ∀(s, k) ∈ S × K.
This is a non-convex mathematical programming problem
with an infinite number of constraints. To compute a day-
ahead decision up, we propose to approximate this problem
by replacing the infinite set of scenarios S by a finite subset Si
adjusted to the problem instance at hand. The next subsection
describes the greedy anytime algorithm that we propose for
iteratively growing such a subset of constraining scenarios.
A. Growing a finite subset of constraining scenarios
Our approach consists in relaxing problem (1)-(8) by replac-
ing the infinite set S of scenarios by a finite subset of “most
constraining scenarios”. Our algorithm builds up iteratively
a growing set of constraining scenarios S1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ Si ⊂
Si+1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ S in the following fashion:
1) At the first iteration, S1 comprises the single reference
scenario s˜ representing the most likely forecast for the
next day. The solution u˜p = up(S1) of problem (1)-
(8) thus represents the optimal strategic decision for
the reference scenario (which, as a matter of fact, may
be obtained by a classical SCOPF computation). As a
byproduct, it provides also the corresponding optimal
preventive/corrective actions (u˜o, and u˜kc , ∀k ∈ K),
which do not take into account any uncertainties about s
but ensure feasibility of next day operation with respect
to s˜. All subsequent subsets Si are supersets of S1, so
that subsequently computed values up(Si) also ensure
feasibility of secure operation with respect to s˜.
2) At every subsequent iteration, we proceed as follows:
a) We fix up to the value up(Si) derived at the
previous step. Then we screen all contingencies
in K by using the approach proposed in [11], in
order to identify the subset Ci ⊂ K of contin-
gencies which require an adjustment of up. This
task also determines the few most constraining
scenarios for each k ∈ Ci, i.e. scenarios that would
lead to the largest violation of post-contingency
constraints despite the best combination of preven-
tive/corrective actions, unless up is adjusted. We
add all these constraining scenarios to the current
subset Si to form Si+1.
b) We compute a new value up(Si+1) for the day-
ahead decision, by solving a special kind of
SCOPF problem searching for the minimum cost
of deviation of up from u˜p such that all scenarios
in Si+1 and all contingencies in K can be handled
by proper adjustments of next-day preventive and
corrective controls.
3) The process is terminated as soon as a fixed point
is reached (no change in either up or Si), or when
computing budgets are exhausted.
Note that at any intermediate iteration, the computed up
covers the reference scenario, and covers a larger set of
uncertain patterns than at the previous iteration. This iterative
process produces hence a sequence of day-ahead decisions of
growing robustness with respect to uncertainties.
We thus reduce the original infinite dimensional problem to
a sequence over two finite dimensional subproblems. Next we
describe how we address these two problems.
B. Computing worst-case scenarios for any contingency given
fixed day-ahead strategic decisions
The computation of worst-case scenarios for a given con-
tingency and a fixed value of up is described in details in Ref.
[11]. To make this paper self-contained, we summarize here
its overall principle, based on three successive steps:
1) Determination of a set of potentially problematic sce-
narios, assuming fully passive operation the next day
(no preventive and no corrective control at all), and
searching in a constraint by constraint basis for the
worst scenario in terms of its post-contingency violation.
To this end we solve a set of OPF-like problems, that
we formulate in details in Appendix A, in number
proportional to the number of constraints.
2) Excluding from the subset of problematic scenarios
those that may be handled by corrective controls only.
3) Excluding among the remaining scenarios those that
may be handled by a combination of preventive and cor-
rective controls. Because the preventive actions covering
the worst-case scenario of a contingency may be detri-
mental to other contingencies, we solve here a classical
SCOPF problem which includes all contingencies K so
as to check whether preventive actions common to all
contingencies exist for this scenario.
All the worst-case scenarios remaining after step 3 call for
adjustments of day-ahead decisions and could thus be included
in the set of constraining scenarios. However, as a byproduct
of the last filtering stage, the constraining scenarios are ranked
by their degree of severity of constraints violations (paper
[11] actually proposes to create two different scenario rankings
according to the nature of the violated constraints, i.e. whether
they target overloads of branches or violations of bus voltage
limits). But, in order to avoid growing too quickly the size of
4the sets Si, we pay attention to identify the umbrella worst-
case scenarios and include only these in the SCOPF-MBC.
Indeed, the top-ranked scenario for each contingency covers
often also its lower ranked scenarios.
From a computational viewpoint, the identification of worst-
case scenarios for all contingencies may lead to a significant
number of OPF problems. However, most of them can be
carried out in parallel, and hence benefit from modern high-
performance computing architectures. Also, step 2 could be
skipped in principle, if the efficiency of this filter is not
sufficient to compensate for the corresponding computational
overhead, and at step 1 the number of constraints might be
pruned a priori by taking advantage of the knowledge a system
operator has about the weak-points of his system.
C. Computing day-ahead strategic decisions for a finite set of
constraining scenarios and all contingencies
If, for one or for several scenarios and/or contingencies, the
system security can not be guaranteed by the sole combination
of preventive and corrective controls applied during the next
day, it will be necessary to determine an appropriate strategic
decision up, so as to enhance the system controllability.
This higher level problem is a finite dimensional relaxation
of the general problem (1)-(8) which computes an optimal
strategic decision up(Si) given the finite subset of constraining
scenarios Si ⊂ S which have been identified to require
strategic day-ahead actions at some iteration of the overall
procedure. However, if at least a worst-case scenario needs
strategic actions we augment the set of constraining scenarios
with all other scenarios that require preventive actions, identi-
fied at step 3 of the algorithm described in the previous section,
to avoid that strategic actions render these latter infeasible.
With respect to usual SCOPF formulations, this higher
level problem includes Multiple Base Cases (MBC), and
will therefore be called hereafter as SCOPF-MBC. We pro-
vide in Appendix B a detailed formulation of our specific
SCOPF-MBC problem which considers generators start-up as
strategic actions and generation re-dispatch as both preven-
tive/corrective actions. Due to the presence in the problem
formulation of binary variables modeling these strategic ac-
tions the SCOPF-MBC problem is a Mixed Integer NonLinear
Program (MINLP). Furthermore, the size of this SCOPF-
MBC problem might be very large, i.e. |Si| times larger
than the size of a classical SCOPF. Appropriate techniques
aiming to decompose the problem (e.g. by identifying the
binding constraints at the optimum) would thus be required in
practical conditions in order to reduce the problem size [15].
We describe in Appendix C how to solve it by a combination
of MILP and NLP approximations of the original MINLP
problem.
D. Some practical considerations for the SCOPF-MBC
The SCOPF-MBC problem may become infeasible4 during
the iterations of the overall approach since more and more
constraining scenarios are included. Rather than abandoning
the computations after a certain number of iterations, it may
be useful to identify which combinations of scenarios and
contingencies lead to infeasibility.
We propose therefore to consider further relaxations of the
SCOPF-MBC problem, specifically:
1) relaxations R-1S which consider one constraining sce-
nario and all contingencies; they are particular instances
of the original problem (1)-(8), where the set S is
reduced to one scenario.
2) relaxations R-1C which consider one contingency and
all constraining scenarios; they are particular instances
of the original problem (1)-(8), where the set S = Si
and set K is reduced to one contingency.
3) relaxations R-S-C which consider only scenarios which
require strategic actions and their corresponding contin-
gencies of set Ci; they are particular instances of the
original problem (1)-(8), where S = Si and K = Ci.
Furthermore contingencies of set Ci that require strategic
actions are added progressively in the above relaxations R-1S
and R-S-C since they are prone to lead to problem infeasibility
in the worst-case of other contingencies.
If any of these relaxations leads to failure of the solution
engine, then the corresponding scenario or contingency is
excluded from the master program. During this process we
pay attention to cover as many as possible combinations of
contingencies and scenarios. We practically search for two
subsets of maximal size S ′′ ⊂ S and K′′ ⊂ K such that
the strategic actions cover all scenarios of set S ′′ and all
contingencies of set K′′. However, at the final solution the
risk assumed by the removal of these scenarios and/or contin-
gencies can be assessed using typical OPF approaches to deal
with infeasible problems. For instance, for each combination
of these removed scenarios and contingencies, this OPF can
seek for the best combination of preventive/corrective actions
to minimize either the amount of remaining overloads, or the
amount of load shedding needed to make the problem feasible.
E. Recapitulation
Figure 1 shows the flowchart of the proposed approach.
Notice that, due to the infinite number of possible uncer-
tainty patterns and the non-convex nature of the optimization
problems that are tackled, our approach can not guarantee that
optimal strategic actions will be found after a finite number
of iterations that would guarantee safe operation with respect
to the full set of initially postulated scenarios. Nevertheless, at
each iteration the strategic control actions determined lead to a
more secure strategy than at the previous iteration (e.g. starting
up a power plant generally enhances security by providing
4In order to identify problem infeasibility we use a classical approach
which consists in relaxing the post-contingency constraints using positive
slack variables and minimizing the sum of these slack variables. Strictly
positive slack variables at the optimum of this problem indicate the constraints
responsible for the infeasibility of the original problem.
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compute common strategic actions for scenarios of set Si+1
compute the worst-cases of any contingency k ∈ K
for which one checks system security under uncertainty
let the iteration number i = 1
including all postulated contingencies of set K
solve the conventional SCOPF
assume a reference scenario Si = {s˜}
is the set S ′i empty ?
end of computations
by solving the SCOPF-MBC problem
implement the strategic actions up(Si+1) in the reference scenario
S ′i is the set of worst-case scenarios that require strategic actions
grow the set of worst-case scenarios Si+1 ← Si ∪ S ′i
increase the iteration count i← i+ 1
Fig. 1. Flowchart of the proposed approach.
an additional degree of freedom), thus yielding an anytime
optimization framework for day-ahead risk management.
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Results using the Nordic32 system
We consider a variant of the “Nordic 32” system shown in
Fig. 2 [16]. The system contains 60 buses, 23 generators, 57
lines, 22 loads, 14 shunts, 27 transformers with fixed ratios,
and 4 transformers with variable ratios.
B. Problem definition and simulation assumptions
The detailed formulation of our problem is provided in Ap-
pendix B. We consider generator startups as strategic decisions
to be decided in operation planning and generation re-dispatch
as preventive/corrective actions. We thus seek to minimize the
cost of generators that must be started up in order to enable
system controllability for the next day with respect to thermal
overloads. The set of strategic operation planning actions is
composed of 7 initially non-dispatched generators that could
be asked to run the next day (namely g2, g3, g4, g16, g17b,
g19, and g21).
Table I shows the range of allowed preventive actions (PA),
as up/down deviations with respect to the classical SCOPF
settings, corrective actions (CA), as up/down deviations with
respect to the pre-contingency state, and strategic actions (SA)
in the form of the generator’s physical active power range.
Uncertainty consists in variable active and reactive power
injections at any load bus, modeled by constraints (10)-(11),






















































Fig. 2. The modified Nordic32 test system.
TABLE I
RANGE OF GENERATION RESCHEDULING (MW) AS PREVENTIVE,
CORRECTIVE, AND STRATEGIC ACTIONS
generator g1 g5 g6 g7 g8 g9 g10
PA (uo) 47.3 31.2 36.8 25.0 63.4 59.1 47.3
CA (uc) 20 30 10
generator g11 g12 g14 g15 g17 g18 g20
PA (uo) 37.4 37.8 41.4 184.0 47.3 35.5 59.1
CA (uc) 40 10 10
generator g2 g3 g4 g16 g17b g19 g21
SA (up) 540 630 540 600 720 540 560
load. Furthermore, the total variation of uncertain active (resp.
reactive) power injections, modeled by constraints (12)-(13),
is trimmed to the range +/- 1 MW (resp. MVar).
We consider a list of 33 N-1 contingencies.
The following simulation cases are considered:
• case 0: the contingency is simulated at the classical
SCOPF solution by a power flow program (hence without
considering any corrective action);
• case WP: the worst uncertainty pattern (WP) correspond-
ing to the contingency, computed as detailed in Ref. [11];
• case WP+CA: the worst uncertainty pattern correspond-
ing to the contingency considering corrective actions
(CA), computed as detailed in Ref. [11];
• case WP+PA+CA: the worst scenario corresponding to
the contingency considering both preventive and correc-
tive controls, computed as detailed in Ref. [11];
• case WP+PA+CA+SA: is a particular case of the
6TABLE II
LINE OVERLOAD (PU) IN THE WORST PATTERN OF CRITICAL
CONTINGENCIES AT THE FIRST ITERATION OF THE ALGORITHM
critical line overloaded







OVERALL LINE OVERLOAD (PU) FOR CRITICAL CONTINGENCIES FOR
VARIOUS CASES DURING THE ITERATIONS OF THE ALGORITHM
case
critical 0 WP WP+CA WP+CA WP+CA
contingency +PA +PA+SA
it. 1 it. 2 it. 1 it. 2 it. 1 it. 2 it. 1 it. 2 it. 1 it. 2
1041-1043 0.02 0.00 0.20 0.12 0.18 0.10 0.14 0.00 0.00 -
4011-4021 0.19 0.00 1.24 0.94 1.02 0.71 0.00 0.00 - -
4022-4031 0.18 0.00 1.17 0.72 0.98 0.46 0.00 0.00 - -
4042-4043 0.16 0.00 0.86 0.51 0.57 0.19 0.00 0.00 - -
4042-4044 0.19 0.08 0.89 0.78 0.60 0.22 0.00 0.00 - -
SCOPF-MBC problem which includes the worst case for
a single contingency and considers strategic actions (SA),
preventive actions and corrective actions.
For the sake of illustration of our approach, all line current
limits have been decreased by 50%, e.g. they are set to 700
MVA, or 7 pu (resp. 175 MVA, or 1.75 pu) on the 400kV
(resp. 130kV) voltage level.
C. Illustration of the approach
We first compute a reference schedule for the nominal sce-
nario by minimizing generation cost with a classical SCOPF
formulation [15] including the 33 contingencies and relying
on the preventive and corrective actions provided in Table I.
At this SCOPF optimum we compute the worst uncertainty
pattern for each contingency with respect to thermal overloads,
using the approach presented in [11]. We notice that only 5 out
of 33 contingencies are critical i.e. they lead to overloads for
their worst uncertainty pattern (case WP). Table II provides
the lines overloaded by the worst pattern of each critical
contingency at the first iteration of the algorithm.
Table III summarizes the results of the main steps of the
approach. Notice that at the first iteration of the algorithm (col-
umn denoted with “it. 1”): neither contingency is controllable
by corrective actions only, 4 contingencies are controllable by
appropriate combinations of preventive and corrective actions,
and one contingency (1041-1043) requires strategic actions.
The latter are computed by solving the SCOPF-MBC problem
which includes the reference scenario and the five worst-cases
of critical contingencies and, for each of them, the whole set
of postulated contingencies. The solution of this SCOPF-MBC
problem indicates as strategic action that generator g17b must
be started up and should produce 269 MW.
At the second iteration a new reference operation schedule
u˜o is computed by solving the conventional SCOPF while
assuming that the generator g17b is started up. From this
reference situation, the whole analysis is carried out again,
to check feasibility of secure operation by trying to identify
new worst-case scenarios.
We observe that the strategic action of requesting the start-
up of g17b has a beneficial impact for all contingencies
since the amount of overload is lower in all cases at the
second iteration. Because all contingencies can now be covered
(even in their worst case scenario) only with preventive and
corrective actions the algorithm’s fixed point is reached.
D. Infeasible relaxations of the SCOPF-MBC problem
The proposed approach may lead to consider very extreme
operating conditions where it may be impossible to satisfy
all postulated constraints; hence some SCOPF-MBC sub-
problems may be prone to infeasibility (see Section III-D). We
highlight hereafter some potential problems that the proposed
approach may encounter and discuss ways to deal with them.
To this end we reduce by 10% the amount of each preventive
action shown in Table I.
The amount of overload on the worst-case is provided in
column WP (it. 1) on Table III. However, due to the smaller
amount of preventive actions two contingencies now require
strategic actions, namely contingency 1041-1043 (resp. 4022-
4031) requires starting up generator g17b (resp. g19) which
must produce 280.7 MW (resp. 439.6 MW).
1) On the need to include into SCOPF-MBC problem
also worst-cases of preventively controllable contingencies:
Before discussing the infeasible cases of various SCOPF-MBC
relaxations we present an example supporting our choice to
include into the SCOPF-MBC problem also worst-cases of
preventively controllable contingencies.
Let us consider the critical contingency 4011-4021
for which there exist preventive actions (and appropriate
contingency-dependent corrective actions) to cover its worst-
case (see section III-B).
However, we notice that the SCOPF problem for this worst-
case, described at step 3 of the algorithm of section III-B,
including the 31 contingencies (contingencies 1041-1043 and
4022-4031 that need strategic actions have been removed)
is infeasible. We have identified 2 contingencies responsible
for infeasibility namely: 4046-4047 and 4043-4047. These
two contingencies are conflicting with 4011-4021. Although
the worst case for 4046-4047 and 4043-4047 does not lead
to overloads (the largest loading being around 97 %) the
preventive actions to cover contingency 4011-4021 (e.g. g15
increases its output with 128 MW to remove the overload due
to contingency 4011-4021) leads to post-contingency overload
of line 4046-4047 (of 0.80 pu, for contingency 4043-4047) and
of line 4043-4047 (of 0.84 pu, for contingency 4046-4047).
Furthermore, the SCOPF-MBC problem including the 31
contingencies for this worst-case is feasible and proposes as
strategic action to start up the generator g17b.
2) Infeasibility of relaxation R-1S of the SCOPF-MBC: Let
us consider the contingency 4022-4031. The solution of the
SCOPF-MBC problem for the worst-case of this contingency
indicates that generator g19 must be started up and produce
439.6 MW. Nevertheless, we notice that at the solution of the
SCOPF-MBC problem two contingencies lead to very large
7overloads: contingency 4045-4062 (resp. 4061-4062) leads to
an overload of line 4061-4062 (resp. 4045-4062) with 2.51
pu (resp. 2.89 pu). However, these contingencies are harmless
in their worst-cases. As can be seen from Fig. 2 these are
conflicting contingencies, since only these two lines carry the
power from generator g19 to the rest of the network, and
hence the SCOPF-MBC problem, which includes them beside
contingency 4022-4031 is infeasible. To carry on the algorithm
they must be removed from the contingency list.
3) Infeasibility of relaxation R-S-C of the SCOPF-MBC:
Although there exist strategic actions to cover the worst-
case of contingency 1041-1043 and 4022-4031 separately,
the SCOPF-MBC problem including only both base cases
and both contingencies is infeasible. The latter is owing to
the generator that to be started up for one contingency is
detrimental to another contingency and vice-versa. Therefore
a choice, according to appropriate criteria, concerning which
contingency to further cover is required.
4) Infeasibility of the whole SCOPF-MBC: By further re-
laxing with 5% the bounds on preventive actions we notice that
there exist strategic actions (e.g. g17b and g19 are started up
and produce 224 MW and 108 MW respectively) to cover both
contingencies that require strategic actions (1041-1043 and
4022-4031). Nevertheless the SCOPF-MBC problem which
includes the 6 scenarios (the reference one and the 5 worst-
cases) and all postulated 33 contingencies is infeasible, except
if one removes contingencies 4061-4062 and 4045-4062.
5) Remarks: These infeasible cases highlight the impor-
tance of choosing realistic bounds on uncertain power injec-
tions. These cases also illustrate that during the procedure
one may have to compute control actions which ensure the
security only with respect to a maximum number of postulated
contingencies. The consequences of contingencies not covered
by this approach can be straightforwardly assessed at the end
of the procedure, as explained in Section III-D.
E. Results using the 1203-bus system
We consider a modified planning model of the RTE5 (the
French TSO) system composed of 1203 buses, 177 generators,
767 loads, 1394 lines, 403 transformers, and 11 shunts.
F. Simulation assumptions
We again use the problem formulation of Appendix B.
The set of strategic actions is composed of 21 initially non-
dispatched generators for the next day. Preventive controls
involve 124 generators (among the 156 dispatched ones) and
consist in up/down deviations of their active power up to
∆P 0i = 0.25P
max
gi . Corrective actions concern 38 generators
and consist in up/down their active power with respect to
their pre-contingency state up to ∆P ki = 0.10(Pmaxgi −Pmingi ).
Uncertain scenarios S consist in variable active/reactive power
injections at 245 significant load buses, modeled by con-
straints (10)-(11), in the range of +/-10% of the nominal ac-
tive/reactive load. Furthermore, the total variation of uncertain
5Note that our computations do not necessarily represent the current or past
operational practice in RTE.
TABLE IV
OVERALL LINE OVERLOAD (PU) FOR CRITICAL CONTINGENCIES FOR
VARIOUS CASES DURING THE ITERATIONS OF THE ALGORITHM
critical case
contingency WP WP+CA+PA WP+CA+PA+SA
it. 1 it. 2 it. 3 it. 1 it. 2 it. 3 it. 1 it. 2 it. 3
C1 4.66 4.64 4.16 1.49 1.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
C2 11.7 11.3 13.1 1.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
C3 2.33 1.55 1.58 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 - -
active/reactive power injections, modeled by constraints (12)-
(13), is trimmed to the range +/- 100 MW/MVar. We consider
a contingency set K of 1029 line outages.
G. Strategic actions to cover the contingencies worst-cases
Note first that during the application of our procedure only
three contingencies denoted hereafter C1, C2, and C3 require
strategic actions at some iterations of the algorithm.
We first compute a reference schedule for the nominal sce-
nario by minimizing generation cost with a classical SCOPF
formulation [15] including only 9 properly selected contingen-
cies and notice that only contingencies C1 and C2 are binding
at the optimum.
At this SCOPF optimum we compute the worst uncertainty
pattern for each contingency with respect to thermal overloads.
Columns labelled “it. 1” in Table IV provide the overall line
overload (pu) for these critical contingencies in various cases
(see IV-B). Column labelled “iteration 1, all” of Table V pro-
vides the strategic actions needed to cover the worst patterns
of critical contingencies as the solution of the SCOPF-MBC
problem. This solution indicates that five generators have to
be started up.
A new reference schedule is computed with a classical
SCOPF formulation which takes into account these strategic
actions. Columns labelled “it. 2” in Table IV shows that these
strategic actions enhance the system security very little as
regards the worst overloads. This is due to fact that the cost of
generators drive naturally the SCOPF solution to the thermal
limit for contingency C2 and very near to the thermal limit
of contingency C1. On the other hand these strategic actions
provide a larger flexibility of the preventive generation re-
dispatch enhancing thereby the controllability of the system.
In consequence at the second iteration only contingency C1
requires further strategic actions as shown in column labeled
“iteration 2” in Table V. Note that because the strategic
actions required to cover contingency C1 (i.e. G1 and G9)
are conflicting with the constraints of contingency C2 the
overall SCOPF-MBC solution leads finally to start up five
new generators in order to cover all contingencies, as shown
in column labelled “iteration 2, all”.
A new reference schedule is computed with a classical
SCOPF formulation which takes into account these new strate-
gic actions. Even if, for reasons explained previously, the worst
overload for contingency C2 is larger than at the previous
iteration, the current reference schedule covers all worst-case
scenarios only by combinations of preventive and corrective
actions and the algorithm hence reaches its fixed point.
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MUST RUN GENERATORS POWER (MW) AT VARIOUS ITERATIONS OF THE
ALGORITHM
gen iteration 1 iteration 2











H. Computational effort of the approach
The average computational effort for each task of our
approach obtained on a PC Pentium IV (1.9-GHz, 2-GB RAM)
for the 1203-bus system is as follows:
• the classical SCOPF to compute a reference schedule
including 9 contingencies takes around 391 seconds;
• the OPF to compute the worst-pattern for a given set of
violated constraints takes around 3 seconds;
• the NLP SCOPF-MBC including 3 (resp. 5) worst cases
and 3 contingencies takes around 410 (resp. 2008) sec-
onds;
• the security analysis of the full set of 1029 contingencies
lasts around 307 seconds.
The MILP problem stemming from the DC approximation of
the SCOPF-MBC (see Appendix C) including 3 (resp. 4) base
cases and 3 (resp. 9) contingencies takes around 19 (resp. 278)
seconds on a computer with 1.86-GHz, 8-GB RAM.
Note that our implementation did not exploit any parallel
computations (inherent to some processes such as the security
analysis, computation of the worst-case for various contin-
gencies) and has also not been particularly optimized for
computational speed. Furthermore, the TSO expertise can be
very useful to filter-out harmless constraints in the worst-case
computation (e.g. by the a priori knowledge of the weak-points
of the grid) and reduce the set of postulated contingencies.
Nevertheless, these computing times suggest that the ap-
proach is computationally intensive but certainly feasible in
day-ahead framework for systems of realistic sizes.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper we have proposed an algorithmic approach for
computing day-ahead operation planning decisions in order
to render feasible next day security management for a range
of possible operating conditions representing the uncertainties
faced by operation planners.
In our work, the uncertainty about the next day operation
is initially represented as an infinite (convex) set of possible
power injection scenarios. Based on this information, we
construct iteratively a finite approximation of this uncertainty
set, yielding an anytime algorithm computing at each iteration
a more robust operation plan for the next day, in the sense
that it covers a larger set of extreme scenarios than the plans
produced at the previous iterations. At the intermediate steps,
many surrogate optimization problems are solved in order to
determine further extreme scenarios in a way driven by a
constraint/contingency wise analysis. An important outcome
of the approach is also the identification of cases where no
strategic action has to be taken in order to cover all worst-
cases during the next day by preventive/corrective controls.
From a practical application point of view, the TSO must be
aware as early as possible of the strategic actions that would
be necessary to cover the operation planning horizon of say 24
to 48 hours, but she/he would postpone as much as possible
the last moment of their implementation (e.g. according to the
minimum notification time required to start up a unit), so as
to possibly take advantage of the reduction of uncertainties
as time passes. Hence these analyses have to be made in a
receding time horizon fashion.
While the computations performed in our approach may
benefit from modern high-performance parallel computing
architectures, further research will look at more efficient con-
straint relaxation schemes, in particular by further untangling
the relaxations along uncertain injection scenarios and along
contingency sets.
Future work should be devoted to more sophisticated uncer-
tainty models, addressing in particular the correlation between
exogenous perturbations.
On the longer term, we think that the proposed approach
is also a basis to develop a rational and practical risk-based
approach to day-ahead security management, with the goal
of minimizing the costs of day-ahead and real-time operation
decisions while constraining the probability of insecure oper-
ation, for example along the ideas proposed in [18]. Within
this context, a fruitful line of investigation would be to take
advantage of recent progress in the context of multi-stage
stochastic programming, especially as concerns the optimal
generation of scenario trees of limited size [19].
Another relevant development of our work is to couple
in a multi-period optimization framework the generators that
need to be started-up to enhance system security for different
periods of time of the next day [20], while taking into account
temporal correlations of uncertain scenarios.
If the market environment allows the intrusion into the solu-
tion of the unit committment our formulation can be naturally
extended to take also into account units de-commitment [17]
at the expense of an increase of the computational effort of
some tasks of the approach such as the MILP approximation
and the NLP relaxations.
APPENDIX
A. Worst scenario with respect to a contingency
The computation of worst scenario with respect to a contin-
gency can be made using the following SCOPF that includes
















9Pminui ≤ Pui ≤ P
max
ui , ∀i ∈ N (10)
Qminui ≤ Qui ≤ Q
max
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gi , ∀i ∈ G, (21)
where, superscript 0 (resp. k) refers to the base case (resp.
contingency k state), Pui and Qui denotes uncertain active
and reactive power injections at bus i, fPi, fQi ∈ {0, 1}
are coefficients indicating buses where power injections are
uncertain (i.e. fPi = 1 or fQi = 1), N is the set of buses, G
is the set of generators, Bi is the set of branches connected to
bus i, the other notations being self-explanatory.
Uncertain injections are limited at each individual bus by
constraints (10) and (11) as well as overall by constraints (12)
and (13).
The objective (9) aims at maximizing the overload of the
branches of set VC. The branches of this set are identified in
a combinatorial fashion as explained in [11] and hence the
above problem may need to be solved several times.
Note that pre-contingency constraints (14)-(18) may be
removed from this formulation since they are often less
restrictive than post-contingency constraints. In this case the
problem is reduced to an OPF that optimizes a single post-
contingency state.
B. Detailed problem formulation
The proposed approach to the day-ahead operational plan-































































j ) ≤ I
max 0
ij , ∀i, j ∈ N , ∀s ∈ S (25)




























gi , ∀i ∈ Up (30)
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max k
ij , ∀i, j ∈ N ,
∀k ∈ K, ∀s ∈ S (33)
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i , ∀i ∈ G, ∀s ∈ S (37)
|P k,sgi − P
0,s
gi | ≤ ∆P
k
i , ∀i ∈ G, ∀k ∈ K, ∀s ∈ S (38)
δi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ Up (39)
where, superscript 0 (resp. k) refers to the base case (resp.
contingency k state), S is the set of scenarios, K is the set of
postulated contingencies, G is the set of dispatched generators,
N is the set of buses, Bi is the set of branches connected to bus
i, Up is the set of strategic actions (i.e. initially non-dispatched
generators), c0,i and c1,i are the start up cost and the operation
cost of generator i, δi is a binary variable indicating whether
the initially non-dispatched generator i is started up or not, P pgi
(resp. Qpgi) is the active (resp. reactive power) of the generator
that can be started up at bus i, hence the vector of strategic
actions up is composed by (P pgi, Q
p
gi), i ∈ Up, any scenario
s is defined by a particular pattern of uncertain injections
(P sui, Q
s
ui), ∀i ∈ N that satisfies constraints (10)-(13) which
defines the set S, the other notations being self-explanatory.
C. Solving the MINLP problem by a heuristic combining
MILP and NLP
Notice that due to the presence in the problem formulation
of binary variables modeling strategic actions (such as gen-
erator start up) our problem is a Mixed Integer NonLinear
Program (MINLP), which also inherits challenging features
of the underlying SCOPF model such as non-convex and very
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large-scale nature. Furthermore, such a MINLP problem has
to be solved in a sequential loop, together with other tasks,
and where the number of iterations is unknown beforehand
(see section III-A). Given the extreme difficulty of the whole
approach for which a reasonable solution is needed in a
bounded time frame, the experience we acquired with various
MINLP solvers [17] suggest that, letting aside their huge
memory requirements, nowadays they can not meet practical
response time requirements in the case of realistic power
system sizes.
For these reasons one needs to rely on heuristic techniques
to solve this MINLP problem. To this end we implemented
an algorithm that combines the resolution of a MILP problem
with a sequence of NLP problems, as detailed hereafter.
The proposed algorithm contains the following steps:
1) Solve the MILP approximation of the original problem
(22)-(39) relying on the DC model. Let the set UOp
denote the generators from Up for which δi = 1 at the
MILP solution, and let URp = Up \ UOp .
2) Solve the NLP problem (22)-(39) where δi = 0, i ∈ URp
and δi = 1, i ∈ UOp .
If this NLP problem is feasible then an acceptable
solution of the original MINLP problem is obtained and
computations end.
3) Otherwise, solve an NLP relaxation of the original prob-
lem (22)-(39) where δi = 1, i ∈ URp , δi = 1, i ∈ UOp , and
the constraints of the generators in set URp are relaxed
to 0 ≤ P pgi ≤ P
max
gi .
a) If P pgi = 0 ∨P pgi ∈ [Pmingi , Pmaxgi ], ∀i ∈ URp then an
acceptable solution of the original MINLP problem
is obtained and computations end.
b) If ∃i ∈ URp such that P pgi ∈ [Pmingi , Pmaxgi ] add





gi ] and adjust URp to Up \ UOp .
Go to step 2.
c) Rank the generators of set URp in decreasing order




d) Pick the top6 ranked generator j and let URp ←
URp \ {j} and UOp ← UOp ∪ {j}.
Go to step 2.
Observe that if the very first set of strategic actions com-
puted by the MILP algorithm proves being insufficient by the
NLP at the second step, then the algorithm solves a sequence
of NLPs which aim at starting up an increasing number of
generators until the NLP becomes feasible.
Note also that in the NLP relaxation at step 3 we approxi-
mate the cost function of an initially non-dispatched generator,
that mixes-up the start up cost c0,i and its operation cost c1,i,
by a quadratic function over the range [0, Pmaxgi ]. We also
assume that generators of set URp produce no reactive power
i.e. Qpgi = 0.
In order to illustrate our approach, we use the solver Xpress-
Mosel [22] to solve the MILP problem and the multiple
6More aggressive strategies could be used, e.g. like a round-off technique,
depending on the time allowed to solve the problem.
centrality corrections interior-point algorithm [23] to solve the
NLP problems.
Our iterative algorithm involves among others the successive
solutions of various NLP problems. While some efficient NLP
solvers rely on warm starts of successive solutions from the
previous one, the interior point method does not naturally
warm start well. Nevertheless, we look forward to assess for
power systems optimization problems the significant improve-
ments on the warm start ability of interior point methods
reported for generic NLPs [21]. Other codes that have proven
their efficiency on many practical applications such as the
sequential linear programming approach of [5] could also be
used in our framework.
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